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Abstract  
Prone to multiple interpretations, ‘security’ is becoming a multiple and hence, nebulous 
concept. Security can be associated with national security and the State’s military 
power; notions of the individual safety; or human values and fundamental rights issues. 
This is clearly demonstrated in Europe with various member states using various 
concepts of security, making them event and space specific. Using two case study 
regions, this paper demonstrates the increasing complexity of the concept of security, 
as prominent security discourses and their impacts and consequences fall across more 
than one category of security dimensions. A large number of actors involved in, and 
affected by, security issues makes it harder to identify security dimensions. The 
political, economic, environmental and other security dimensions are interconnected 
and form a complex system of inter- and intra- dependent networks. Understanding 
these complexities will aid policy makers in formulating measures that influence an 
evolving European concept of security.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
‘Security’ is a complex concept that is becoming nebulous, as it is prone to multiple 
interpretations both across and within different societies and cultures, domains of 
human activity, academic disciplines and so on. Security can be associated with the 
national security of states mainly buttressed by military power; at the same time, it is 
inextricably tied up with notions of the safety of individuals grounded in the fulfilment of 
basic Maslowian needs; and for yet others human values and fundamental rights 
issues are crucial elements of security. This is clearly demonstrated in Europe: despite 
being under one political umbrella - the European Union - various European member 
states adopt various concepts of security, making them event and space specific. 
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the complexity of the concept of security using 
two European case study regions: North-West Europe (NWE) and South-East Europe 
(SEE) provide a sense of the complex interconnectivity of the debates that have 
shaped / are shaping the security discourse, as well as the disconnected dimensions 
that could be considered under this nebulous and politically charged term. 
The approach to security employed in this paper (discussed in Section 2) and its 
perception are in many aspects similar to the capability approach to social problems as 
theorised by Sen [1] and later expanded [2]. Where the capability approach defines a 
certain set of functioning and opportunity freedom, the case study regions discussed in 
this paper look at different types of security perceptions in different fields (e.g. territorial 
security as opposed to physical security). The capability approach thus represents one 
possibility to complement this approach by looking at possibilities to improve people’s 
capabilities in order to heighten their security. 
2 METHODOLOGY 
Based on the methodology developed for the EvoCS project,1 this paper employs a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and datasets that have been 
combined to identify the dimensions of security over time for the two discussed regions. 
Whilst four regions have been analysed during the project, only two will be discussed in 
this paper:  
 North-Western EU (United Kingdom, Netherlands, France) 
 South-Eastern Europe (Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey).  
These regions have been chosen due to their historical differences and the roles they 
are playing in the EU: the NWE region is seen as the core (financial and political), 
whereas the SEE region is a relatively new member of the EU with some of the 
countries still not being a part of the Union. In addition, the threats and challenges 
these regions are facing differ quite dramatically, which emphasises the challenge the 
EU is facing in developing a singular security strategy. 
A comprehensive coding of approximately 2,300 relevant documents was also 
conducted using an analytical framework [3]. 
A concept of security consists of five dimensions: the core values which refer to the 
different aspects of life that actors seek to secure including physical safety and 
security, territorial integrity and security, environmental and ecological security, social 
stability and security, cultural identity and security, political stability and security, 
economic prosperity and security and information and cyber security; the types of 
security challenges that affect these core values which can be either risks, threats or 
hazards; the levels at which security needs to be protected which may include the 
local, subnational, international, transnational and global level; the actors that are 
involved including – but not limited to – national or local government, the private sector, 
civil society or the individual citizen; and the ethical and human rights issues which 
manifest themselves in this process.  
Different beholders prioritise different core values and perceive different security 
challenges; they prefer these to be addressed by different actors at different levels, and 
consider different ethical and human rights issues to be a problem. In order to assess 
these differences empirically, the research process was divided into two stages. 
                                                     
1 More information about the Evolving Concept of Security (EvoCS) project can be found at: http://www.evocs-
project.eu/ 
In the first stage, currently prevailing security concepts in their respective countries 
across six principal security discourses (government, parliament, academia, media, the 
private sector and the NGO sector) were assessed. For each discourse in each 
country, a similar set of documents was retrieved based on a set of predefined criteria 
and a set of detailed retrieval instructions. The documents were then manually coded; 
this process relied on a uniform coding scheme in order to elicit various concepts of 
security. The results were then recorded in a centrally managed online data repository 
to which all country team researchers had access.  
In stage two the findings were further analysed through a series of workshops held 
around Europe in early 2015 and desk-based research. The principal purpose was to 
get a more granular understanding based on in-depth qualitative analysis of the 
findings unearthed in stage one. The evolution of countries’ and regions’ concepts of 
security over the past decade was also described qualitatively to get a better grip on 
the recent historical context in which it emerged. 
3 CASE STUDIES 
3.1 North-Western Europe region 
In the period after the Second World War, NWE region has been relatively stable from 
the political and economic perspectives. Nevertheless, a number of threats (such as 
terrorism and natural hazards) have been affecting the region. NWE region plays a key 
role in EU security policy due to the historic and financial role of the countries that 
compose this region. In particular, the main roles are played by the UK, France and 
Germany: they can still rely on their own political weight to influence developments and 
are less dependent on multilateral institutions; they are part of several institutional 
frameworks (e.g. NATO) in which they can operate, with the EU being just one these 
frameworks; they are involved in shaping policies on various levels and across a much 
wider range than other states.  At the same time, the region has differences within itself 
which can affect the future of the EU security: France has a desire to play a leading 
role in the EU, whereas the UK is not sure whether it really belongs in the union at all 
and whether or not to remain in it. The role of the Netherlands however should not be 
underestimated as it is an important player in developing cooperation within the region.  
Physical safety and security is by far the most salient core value in the NWE region, 
with social stability and security (in particular in France, where the issue of immigration 
is very prominent), information and cyber security, and economic prosperity and 
security also being widely discussed. The two latter core values are extremely 
intertwined, particularly when it comes to the context of cyber-crime. Within the most 
prominent core values, the most salient threats for the NWE region are cybercrime and 
terrorism.  Other threats that are discussed in the NWE’s popular discourse include 
immigration (including illegal immigration), natural hazards, climate change, and energy 
and food supply.    
The UK, France and the Netherlands security strategies were written in approximately 
the same time in the late 2000s as they – and a region as a whole – were trying to 
redefine their approach to national security in light of changes in NATO and expansion 
of the EU. The national security strategies of the region share a similar way of adopting 
a risk-based ‘all hazards’ and ‘all of society’ approach as the new security direction. 
One of the most prominent similarities is the focus on the same security issues. 
Terrorism is a regional issue which, however, is mainly discussed at a national level; 
the discourse of terrorism includes not the terrorist attack but also the issues of 
radicalisation and polarisation. Supply-related threats (particularly energy supply) 
provide another good example: despite searching for new energy sources (e.g. 
fracking) and investing in renewable energy sources (e.g. solar and wind in Germany), 
the NWE region is highly dependent on the fossil fuels supply from politically unstable 
regions (such as Russia). The main focus of the security discourse is on the national 
level, with national actors playing the most prominent role across the region. At the 
same time, general public which is perceived as the main object of threats hardly plays 
any role in this discourse.  
There are however some differences in the way security issues are addressed. For 
example, the Netherlands is very outward looking, with large focus on the international 
state (it has even implemented an International Security Strategy [5]). Both national 
and international strategies overlap, but it is the only country that explicitly states the 
role that international affairs play in its security discourse. At the same time France and 
the UK acknowledge the role of the international actors yet mainly discuss the issues at 
a national level. Another example is the perception of the roles within the EU: the UK 
sees EU as mainly a trade partner (as many of its security deals are with the USA), 
whereas the Netherlands and France are more reliant on the EU in terms of security 
cooperation. The 2008 Financial crisis is admitted as a security issue in the region, 
however the discussion of its implications for the security in the UK is largely absent, 
whereas in Netherlands and France it further reinforced the inward shift, with socio-
economic dimensions (such as unemployment; health; security of the elderly; and 
pensions) attaining greater salience. 
The roles NWE region countries play in the EU is another interesting aspect that can 
influence the future developments in the security on the EU level. NWE is the largest 
(in terms of the population and the wealth) in the EU. Whilst all three analysed 
countries acknowledge that the EU is critical for their security and prosperity, their roles 
within the EU security agenda differ. The EU acts as a bloc with all 28 member states 
discussing issues and unanimously making decisions, but many argue that behind the 
scenes lies a tacit agreement that the Big Three - France, Germany, and the UK-  take 
the lead on foreign policy, including security matters. UK and France continue to play 
important roles in the EU security (particularly in NATO), but they are also very 
protective of their sovereignty [6]. The Netherlands on the other hand prioritises 
integration with EU to also pursue defence cooperation within Europe, both 
multilaterally and bilaterally [7]. 
Overall, the NWE region shares similarities as well as having very specific differences, 
however security is at the top of the agenda in the region, which is demonstrated by the 
existence of the National Security Strategies in analysed countries as well as specific 
security strategies for particular threats.  
3.2 South-Eastern Europe region 
The SEE region constitutes an area that stands out in a number of striking ways. Not 
all countries in this region are part of the EU (e.g. Albania or Macedonia), some of them 
are in NATO (Bulgaria), while some have declared neutrality (Serbia). In the western 
part of SEE - the territory of former Yugoslavia - the worst military conflicts after World 
War II took place, with ethnic tensions still taking place (e.g. Macedonia in early 2015). 
Serbia was a major party during the Yugoslav civil war, therefore Serbian society was 
embedded in the broader context of socialist Yugoslavia, and in the last two decades 
have been having to adjust to a new political and economic system. It does not have 
NATO or EU membership but is a candidate country for the latter, and has strong ties 
with Russia. Serbia has an ongoing territorial conflict with one of its (former2) provinces: 
Kosovo and Metohia. Serbia’s direct neighbour - Bulgaria - is an EU, and a NATO 
member. Bulgaria also has traditional ties with Russia and was part of the Eastern bloc, 
which is why Bulgaria still struggles with economic and societal transformation 
                                                     
2 Kosovo has been recognized by over 100 states. However, for EvoCS, Kosovo was treated as an internal province of 
Serbia in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and to include Kosovo in the national case study. 
processes. The Republic of Turkey has been a candidate country for the EU for almost 
a decade and is a NATO member. Its population is mostly Muslim; it has a common 
border with crisis-stricken states like Syria or Iraq. Along with similar security 
discourses as in the other countries of the region, Turkey faces a couple of unique 
internal (e.g. the Gulen movement) and external (e.g. groups fighting in the Syrian civil 
war) challenges. Together, these three national case studies represent a good sample 
of the diversity of the security discourse in SEE. Each of these countries has a number 
of unique security challenges and some that are common to all of them. 
In recent history, the countries of SEE have been part of three different blocs, i.e. the 
western and eastern bloc and the movement of non-aligned countries. All this changed 
with the end of the Cold War, when countries such as Bulgaria or Romania started the 
transformation of their societies and economies towards the West. Such history was 
clearly reflected in the coding results.  
Case study countries from this region have different foci. Physical safety and security is 
an often discussed core value in Serbia and in Turkey (where territorial integrity and 
security is also salient), but it is less prominent in Bulgaria, which mainly focuses on 
political stability and security. What the three studied countries do have in common is 
the fact that the environmental and ecological security and information and cyber 
security are the least salient. 
SWE is also diverse in the security challenges the countries face, even though certain 
common issues can be identified. For instance, Serbia still observes the conflict with 
Kosovo and Metohia as an important security issue, although its focus has changed. 
While it was (and to a certain but much weaker degree still is) an issue of territorial 
integrity and security, current discussions concentrate on the situation of the Serbian 
community in Kosovo and their well-being [8]. Turkey faces a similar issue with its 
Kurdish minority (which has also weakened in recent years due to an on-going peace 
process). Serbia and Bulgaria are both struggling with the integration of their Roma 
communities, even though both countries have adopted national strategies for this [9]. 
There are also aspects that all three of the studied countries have in common: the 
security discourse predominantly takes place on a national level; and the main 
addressor of the security discourse in all three countries is the national government. In 
Bulgaria, the case is particularly interesting, since, according to the EvoCS coding 
findings, the addressor is the national government, while, according to [10] the people 
of Bulgaria in general seem to distrust their governing bodies (such trends can often be 
found in other countries of the region). 
Similarly to NWE, security is an important aspect in the SEE public discourse and is 
addressed in the various national security strategies. In Serbia, the security challenges 
found in the coding exercise are mostly addressed in the national security strategy, 
while in Bulgaria the findings from the Bulgarian governmental annual report on 
Defence and Armed Forces are quite different from the findings of the project [11]. But 
one also has to keep in mind that the region is very different from NWE in many 
aspects like its historical background, salience of different core values and the 
existence of other security challenges [12]. 
4 DISCUSSION  
The security policies of the European Union need to be effective (in protecting our 
societies), efficient (in the way these policies are executed), representative (for the 
security interests of different societies in the Union), in compliance with the EU legal 
and fundamental rights framework, and perceived as legitimate (by its citizens), and 
reflect national concerns and priorities as well as European ones. These are revealed 
in the four dimensions through which security is discussed in this paper (the first 
dimension - core values - is presented across the remaining four dimensions).  
4.1 Actors 
A variety of actors are involved in the popular discourse of security in NWE and SEE, 
however the most prominent addressor in both regions is national government, with its 
role being particularly noticeable when it comes to addressing the issues relevant to 
physical security and safety. The role of the private sector as an addressor increases 
dramatically in the context of cybersecurity, which is not surprising as they are 
perceived to also be an object of this threat. The actors which are addressed on the 
security issues are also diverse. Again, national government plays the largest role as 
an addressee, however the private sector – particularly in the case of cybersecurity in 
NWE - is also perceived to be an actor that should listen to what addressors have to 
say. In both regions, foreign government acts as an addressee in the context of 
terrorism: this may be explained by the efforts of all six governments to find the root of 
the terrorism problem and reduce its impacts. Whilst being by far the largest object of 
the majority of the threats in the both regions, general public at the same time they play 
a very little role (if any) as addressors or addressee.  
Overall in both regions, national governments and parliament have the largest say and 
are the largest recipients of the information. In the NWE however whilst mostly talking 
to themselves, governments are also trying to connect with the private sector, which is 
a core of a region’s economies. At the same time there is very little contact with local 
and regional governments, which are in charge of implementing security-related 
policies on the ground. Similarly, the general public who is perceived to be the largest 
object of threats is hardly being communicated to, thus it is unclear whether the general 
public should fully rely on governments’ decisions when it comes to security matters.  
4.2 Sources 
Physical safety and security - the most salient core value in both regions - is discussed 
in most of the sources all sources, with government, parliament and newspaper 
publications covering this core value most. The exception is academic publications, 
which only seldom discuss physical safety and security in both regions (and when it 
does it solely focuses on terrorism (UK) and Kosovo war (Serbia)). Economic 
prosperity and security is also discussed in all the sources (except for academia in 
SEE), and in particular by private sector in NWE. 
Terrorism and cyber-crime get wide coverage by a diverse set of sources in the NWE, 
with the national government publications playing the largest role when it comes to the 
discussion of terrorism. Newspapers also largely cover terrorism: this could be 
explained by the fact that terrorism-related stories attract more audience attention, as a 
terrorist attack would potentially have a large impact. Parliament and government 
publications have a more balanced coverage focusing on both issues, however slightly 
more attention is paid to terrorism. There is a sense that the issue of cyber-crime is 
being left to private businesses to resolve on its own, with only very few guidance from 
the government. NGOs are not discussing the most salient threats in the region; their 
main focus is on food supply, social stability and climate change, which is not 
surprising: as NGOs often address the importance of these issues. SWE differs slightly: 
main security challenges discussed are organised crime and corruption, but challenges 
such as violence against women, natural hazards, traffic security and a major influx of 
refugees (Serbia and Turkey) or the integration of the Roma minority and control of the 
security intelligence services (Serbia and Bulgaria) are also covered.  Government 
policy documents and parliamentary debates tend to discuss all core values, sources 
from the private sector focus on economic prosperity and security, and the NGOs 
(among other core values) on social stability and security.  
4.3 Levels 
The main level at which security is discussed in both regions is national, however the 
discussed threats differ: such, at the national level the NWE region mainly focuses on 
terrorism and cyber-crime (with these issues also being touched upon at an 
international level), whereas in SWE it is organized crime and corruption. Global level 
is very rarely a part of the security discourse in the context of the analysed threats. In 
both regions, larger attention is paid to security at the national level. With an exception 
of Serbia which focuses on subnational level in the context of on-going Kosovo conflict, 
it is surprising that very little discussion is taking place at subnational and local levels, 
as some of the most salient threats (such as terrorism, cyber-crime or natural hazards) 
could have a large impact on a local scale. In addition, the main object of these threats 
being general public and private sector, both operating at local level, are thus largely 
ignored.  
Different publications focus on different levels when it comes to specific threats. For 
example, government publications cover various levels, and whilst national level is 
prominent in the NWE region, both terrorism and cyber-crime are discussed in the 
context of international and transnational levels, but hardly touch upon local level. In 
SEE, some of the local discussions tend to focus on traffic security issues (for instance 
in Serbia). But this is probably due to a law being passed in the period under scrutiny. 
4.4 Human rights and ethical issues 
When it comes to the most salient threats discussed here, human rights and ethical 
issues are not very often touched upon. NWE region demonstrates some concern 
(although human rights are seen as a ‘mentioned’ rather than ‘main’ topic, as has 
already been discussed in the UK profile), but only briefly related to these issues when 
it comes to terrorism and cyber-crime, mainly in NGO reports, parliament publications 
and newspaper. Overall in the NWE region human rights are most prominently 
discussed under the physical safety and security and social stability and security core 
values. In SEE, human rights and ethical issues are discussed more often, with issues 
like discriminations against minorities, women and/or the lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender community or the rights of refugees found in the security discourse. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This paper demonstrated a kaleidoscopic, but at the same time comprehensive, 
overview of the key elements of security perceptions in two regions, which at first 
glance seem very different. 
Indeed, the historical situation and political context in which these regions have 
developed impact the perception of security. The NWE region, whilst addressing the 
traditional areas of security, is also shifting its focus on newly emerging threats such as 
cybercrime and terrorism, as well as encouraging the securitisation of threats that have 
not been covered by the security discourse previously (e.g. climate change). In the 
SEE region, the security discourse is dominated by more “traditional” security 
challenges like organised crime and corruption on the one hand and on historical 
problems that are still important like the Kosovo conflict in Serbia, the relations with 
Russia in Bulgaria or the internal threats (e.g. the Gulen movement) in Turkey. The 
difference between the regions lies in the historical context: ethnic struggles are mostly 
(with an exception of the Northern Ireland) a thing of the past in NWE, and the security 
discussions have moved onwards to modern “non-traditional” challenges. 
However two regions also have quite a lot in common. For instance, although the EU 
promotes cooperation among the member states as well as with third country partners, 
both regions – and the countries within the regions - whilst mentioning cooperation -
focus largely on their own efforts, capacities and capabilities in addressing various 
threats. The most prominent security discourse happens at the national level 
emphasising a strong focus on the internal situation and not so much on the regional or 
European. The roles various actors play in the security discourse – with the 
government being the most prominent actor – are also very similar.  
In conclusion, the two European regions are in many ways surprisingly similar, 
considering the many specific historical and political differences between them. These 
findings are important because they will feed into the policymaking process by 
establishing the representativeness and legitimacy of European security policies and 
their ability to account for the geo-political contexts and stakeholder perspectives 
across which they must navigate. From a European point of view, this might be seen as 
an opportunity since future European Security Strategies can better address shared 
security problems of both EU and (possible future) non-EU members. 
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